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1

INTRODUCTION

In her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker develops an account of two kinds
of epistemic injustice. Her focus is on unjustifiable systemic disadvantages from which members
of oppressed groups suffer when they 1) seek to offer testimony to others about what they know
and 2) to interpret their own social position and life experience. She calls the unjust burdens of
interpreting one’s position and experience “hermeneutical injustice.” Despite the intuitive appeal
of her account of such injustice, Fricker has been criticized for falsely assuming a monolithic
view of the interpretive resources available in a society. In this thesis, I rebut such criticisms by
arguing that they overlook the extent to which hermeneutical injustice is a matter of the
distribution of epistemic labor. By epistemic labor, I mean very generally the effort exerted in
forming, questioning, and revising beliefs and in seeking resources to support this process.
Fricker’s account neglects to explicitly identify this aspect of hermeneutical injustice, but, as I
will argue, including the special burden carried by marginalized groups in our understanding of
hermeneutical injustice makes sense of this injustice in a way that is compatible with epistemic
agency and even epistemic advantages of the oppressed.
José Medina offers a pluralized analysis of hermeneutical resources available to the
oppressed which is sensitive to the variety and dynamicity of the interpretations available within
marginalized communities. While his analysis accurately captures certain features of the
dynamic reality of social epistemic interaction, I argue that Medina’s account fails to recognize
the injustice of the special burden members of marginalized groups confront in making sense of
their social experiences. What he identifies as epistemic virtues (often developed by the
oppressed) are often domain-specific, and thus the sense-making effort exerted by the oppressed
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is better described as epistemic labor made necessary by the hermeneutical marginalization of
one’s group than as the performance of epistemic virtues.
In what follows, I begin in section II by outlining the types of epistemic injustices
Miranda Fricker identifies. In section III I turn to a critic of her work in order to show that the
development of non-dominant or resistant hermeneutical resources involves significant work,
and in section IV I argue that this work in fact is a component of hermeneutical injustice. In
section VI I argue that Medina’s analysis of the epistemic virtues developed in oppressive
contexts does not register this type of harm. I reject Medina’s claim that epistemic advantages
originate from virtues commonly found among the oppressed, and argue instead that oppression
often makes it the case that oppressed subjects’ epistemic needs align with true beliefs about
their situation, yet these beliefs are made less accessible to those who would (most) benefit from
them by hermeneutical marginalization. Finally, in section VIII I argue that Medina’s addition to
(or expansion of) Fricker’s hermeneutical sensitivity should be distinguished as a second type of
responsibility given agents’ quotidian interests in avoiding inordinate epistemic labor and in
holding beliefs that are simply accurate enough to serve their needs.
2

FRICKER’S INJUSTICES

Miranda Fricker distinguishes two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial and
hermeneutical. Both kinds operate according to identity power, which Fricker defines as “a form
of social power which is directly dependent upon shared social-imaginative conceptions of the
social identities of those implicated in the particular operation of power.” (2007: 4) Thus, both
forms of injustice are part of the broader category of identity-based social injustice. Testimonial
injustice involves diminished credibility accorded to a person’s testimony in light of their
(perceived) social type. Fricker’s paradigmatic example of this form of injustice is the police’s
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disbelief of a black person’s word. Testimonial injustice is rooted in the prejudice of a hearer and
perpetrated by that hearer. By contrast, hermeneutical injustice is not committed by some agent.
Fricker writes that “no agent perpetrates hermeneutical injustice—it is a purely structural
notion,” (2007:159) defined as “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social
experience obscured from collective understanding owing to hermeneutical marginalization.”
(2007:158) Hermeneutical marginalization refers to an oppressed group’s exclusion from the
prominent meaning-making roles of a society such as careers in law, journalism, and academia.
A paradigmatic case of hermeneutical injustice is a person’s confusion about their own queer
sexuality or gender identity in circumstances that allow no exposure or access to others with
comparable identities or to other sources of information such as literature.1
Fricker acknowledges that instances of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are
possible outside of more general systems of oppression but focuses on the systemic variety. She
notes that hermeneutical injustice is closely connected to the testimonial variety, writing that the
fact “that hermeneutical injustice most typically manifests itself in the speaker struggling to
make herself intelligible in a testimonial exchange raises a grim possibility: that hermeneutical
injustice might often be compounded by testimonial injustice.” (2007: 159) Critics have taken
issue with Fricker’s discussion of hermeneutical injustice on the grounds that it presupposes
some single, coherent system of shared ideas available to the members of a given society for
making sense of their experiences in which hermeneutical resources either circulate or do not. In
reality, her critics point out, there is no such single, coherent system. I now turn to a prominent
critic who argues along these lines.

1

Exposure to models with like identities that is heavily mediated by oppressive hermeneutical resources can also
contribute to hermeneutical injustice, though a straightforward lack of exposure to similar others more
straightforwardly contributes to an unjust hermeneutical lacuna.

4

3

A CRITIQUE OF FRICKER’S ACCOUNT OF THE COLLECTIVE
HERMENEUTICAL RESOURCE

Rebecca Mason identifies in Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice a failure to
distinguish various social knowledge-sharing groups. While Fricker points out that
hermeneutical injustice depends on “shared social-imaginative conceptions of the social
identities of those implicated in the particular operation of power,” (2007: 4 emphasis added)
Mason argues that Fricker does not pay sufficient attention to the multiplicity of communities
which internally share social-imaginative conceptions. Making use of Charles Mills’ account of
the ignorance of dominant groups to the conditions of the groups they oppress, Mason argues
that the conflation of hermeneutical resources of dominant and marginalized/oppressed groups
into those of a single universal social discourse undervalues the hermeneutical resources
available to members of oppressed groups. Mason writes, “Fricker problematically identifies
‘collective’ hermeneutical resources with that which is articulated and taken up in dominant
discourses” (2011: 298) and holds that this is problematic in that it “pays insufficient attention to
non-dominant hermeneutical resources to which members of marginalized groups have access in
order to render their social experiences communicatively intelligible.” (2011: 298) Because,
according to Mason, members of marginalized groups are in fact capable (even uniquely
capable) of understanding and testifying to their experiences, the injustice committed when an
experience of oppression is not recognized by the dominant social discourse is not a structural
phenomena which results in the inability of members of the marginalized groups to make sense
of their experiences of marginalization in a way that can be communicated to others.
Mason highlights an example given by Fricker of a case of hermeneutical injustice which
she takes to show that Fricker does not attribute proper epistemic agency to marginalized
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subjects who “have non-dominant interpretive resources from which they can draw to understand
and describe their experiences despite absences or distortions that exist in so-called collective
hermeneutical resources.” (2011: 295) In this case, a woman, Carmita Wood, experienced
repeated sexual harassment before it was so named. Wood eventually quit her job because of the
harassment and was denied unemployment insurance. In response to the denial, Wood sought out
feminist activists who both assisted her in legal recourse for the denial of unemployment
insurance and held a conference during which women shared their experiences of sexual
harassment and together gave it this name. Mason denies that Wood’s experience was rendered
unintelligible (a component of hermeneutical injustice according to Fricker), writing that Wood’s
responses to the insurance claim denial “were not the actions of a woman mystified by her
experiences of a yet-to-be-named phenomenon.” (2011: 297)
Mason concludes, pace Fricker, that hermeneutical injustice can not be a purely structural
phenomenon that is not perpetrated by any specific person or persons. Rather, we see case after
case of hermeneutical resources forged within oppressed groups which, in spite of being welldeveloped and readily communicated, are resisted by specific members of mainstream society.
Mason makes the point that for Wood, “rather than functioning as ‘a life-changing flash of
enlightenment,’ naming [sexual harassment] created a hermeneutical environment conducive to
organized social activism against one manifestation of sexism” (2011: 298). Mason adds, “the
act of naming in which Wood participated incited social change.” (2011: 298) So Mason shows
us that while Wood surely gained a deeper understanding of the universality of sexual
harassment through talking to women about their similar experiences, the primary injustice she
suffered came from the failure by those in positions of power to recognize the experiences she
attempted to communicate. Her experience was not ultimately unintelligible. Mason proposes

6

that “an unknowing to which members of dominant groups are subject by virtue of their ethically
bad knowledge practices” (2011: 295) better characterizes what Fricker describes as a
hermeneutical gap.
In sum, Mason holds that members of oppressed groups are positioned to more readily
understand their oppression than are members of dominant groups. Gaps in the hermeneutical
resources of the dominant social sphere are not to be identified with gaps in the resources of
oppressed groups. Fricker’s paradigm example of hermeneutical injustice reveals that the victim
of still-unnamed sexual harassment in fact had a keen understanding of her experience and its
connection to her broader oppression and so did not suffer under the interpretive gap Fricker
takes as the core problem of hermeneutical injustice. According to Mason, by failing to
recognize that understanding, Fricker contributes to the injustice suffered by the oppressed. That
is, Mason takes issue with “Fricker’s claim that a ‘gap’ in collective hermeneutical resources
prevents marginalized subjects from understanding their own experiences” (2011: 295) on the
grounds that it is both inaccurate and ethically irresponsible. In the following section I argue that
while it is true that the oppressed can and do develop hermeneutical resources appropriate to
their experiences, hermeneutical injustice makes it the case that access to these resources
involves work that would not be necessary absent hermeneutical marginalization.
4

IN DEFENSE OF A MONOLITHIC SOCIAL MILIEU (TWO KINDS OF
HARMS)
In this section I argue that hermeneutical injustice is not simply a straightforward

problem of lacking interpretive resources (as much of Fricker’s language suggests). It is also a
problem of the burden confronted by the oppressed of recreating interpretive resources that
others in their group have already created but have been unable to effectively circulate
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throughout the group, and a problem of the communication of the relevant experiences to others
requiring inordinate effort. I argue that Mason mistakenly concludes that Wood’s demonstration
of some understanding of the injustice done to her implies the absence of hermeneutical
injustice. In order to demonstrate that hermeneutical injustice is operative even when oppressed
subjects have well-developed hermeneutical resources, I will distinguish two kinds of wrongful
harms which hermeneutical injustice may cause. I do not mean this distinction to be exhaustive
of the sorts of harms constitutive of or caused by hermeneutical injustice. Nor do I claim to
identify an empirically clean distinction. Rather, the distinction is meant to clarify some ways in
which lucidity, epistemic advantages, and hermeneutical injustices can co-occur.
First, hermeneutical injustice inflicts wrongful harm insofar as the truth about some
social phenomenon is obscured or rendered unintelligible. Second, hermeneutical injustice
inflicts wrongful harm insofar as members of marginalized groups must exert inordinate effort in
order to benefit from their epistemic community. Mason takes Fricker to be claiming that the
first sort of harm affected Carmita Wood before sexual harassment was so named. When a
straightforward gap exists in the interpretive resources of a community, those with an interest in
the relevant understanding experience a hermeneutical injustice. Mason is right to point out that
Carmita Wood did not suffer this sort of injustice because she did not suffer under a total
hermeneutical lacuna. We can expect hermeneutical injustices of this sort to most intensely affect
those who have little to no exposure to others with similar experiences and/or who have had few
similar experiences themselves.
Although Fricker sometimes writes as though understanding one’s social experience is a
binary on/off property, her examples of hermeneutical injustice suggest that a complete lack of
understanding is not all that she intends hermeneutical injustice to reference. It is clear that
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Carmita Wood had some understanding of her experience. Portions of her response to the
experience demonstrate her understanding. (Seeking feminist lawyers, requesting a transfer, etc.)
But rather than comparing Carmita Wood’s behaviors to what we would expect of someone who
completely lacked understanding of her situation, we might compare her behaviors and
communicative efforts to what we would expect if the “background condition of hermeneutical
injustice” (2007:159) were absent. If Wood experienced unwanted sexual advances from her
supervisor within a culture that readily recognized these actions as worthy of punishment and
part of a more general pattern of quotidian oppression, we can imagine that Wood may not have
initially taken it upon herself to try to avoid the harassment. She might have quickly reported to
her supervisor if she had reason to believe her report would be believed and addressed, and may
not have developed physical symptoms of stress as she attempted to avoid interactions with her
harasser. While Wood had some understanding of her experience, a well-developed
comprehension of sexual harassment as common, undeserved, and connected to wider injustices
was not readily available to her or to those whose understanding of her experience might have
contributed to a just response.
When members of a group with similar social experiences are excluded from the
meaning-making roles of their society (however informal these roles may be), the resources they
discover or invent as they meet their epistemic needs often constitute a re-creation of
hermeneutical resources which, absent hermeneutical marginalization, would be (more) readily
available. The hermeneutically marginalized, in order to simply meet their communicative needs
and to achieve a level of understanding which could ease the cognitive discomfort that comes
from what Mills has described as “the phenomenological experience of the disjuncture between
official (white) reality and actual (nonwhite) experience,” (1997:109) often must re-invent the
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conceptual wheel from their pre-theoretic experiences. As Mason’s example of the welldeveloped hermeneutical resources of racialized groups illustrates, it is sometimes possible for
the oppressed to separate from the dominant group and to create and circulate interpretive
resources among themselves. By limiting their epistemic community to exclude their oppressors,
the oppressed may create an environment in which they can have (relatively easier) access to the
benefits of their epistemic community.2 The labor of theorizing some sort of experience can be
eased when those with similar experiences have already developed and circulated relevant
interpretive heuristics.
The conference which named sexual harassment developed the participating women’s
ability to quickly communicate about an experience, but it is not true, as Mason makes clear, that
“the lexical gap that was later filled in with the name sexual harassment rendered women’s
experience of it confused and inarticulate.” (2011: 297) While Mason’s identification of
marginalized hermeneutical resources is an important contribution to and critique of Fricker’s
account of hermeneutical injustice, Mason overlooks the fact that marginalized groups interact
with their oppressors and do not reap the full epistemic benefits of their communities even as
they work to overcome their epistemic marginalization. It is notable that Mason relies
particularly on examples of the epistemic resources of members of marginalized racial groups
while Fricker focuses more on the experiences of women and LGBTQ+ people. Although the
pattern is nuanced, it is broadly true that women are dispersed throughout the population, while
marginalized racial groups maintain a higher degree of separation from the dominant racial
group. While people of color clearly do interact with whites, women are the prototypical

2

I do not claim that oppressed groups need not interact with their oppressors, but that they are in different ways
able to separate, and to the extent that they can create their own truly separate social epistemic community they
do not experience or are more readily able to overcome hermeneutical injustice.
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example of a group dispersed among their oppressors. Other examples of dispersal are
marginalized genders, sexual minorities, and people with certain disabilities or chronic illnesses,
and for these groups, dispersal is further compounded by their being fewer in number than
women. To the extent that an oppressed group is excluded from the (dominant) discourse within
their own society, they will find hermeneutical resources appropriate to their experiences lacking
or obscured, and so are deprived of the full benefits of access to others’ epistemic labor.
Mason draws attention to the existence of well-developed hermeneutical resources among
the marginalized, but their development is not automatic, and access to resources normally
requires communication among the marginalized. This communication involves less work
wherever the oppressed interact with other members of their oppressed group in daily life3. As
Mills points out, members of oppressed groups have an epistemic advantage in the sense of
dissonance between received white theory and actual non-white experience, and he notes that
this dissonance “generates an alternative moral and political perception of social reality.” (1997:
109, emphasis added) While an alternative perception is to some degree available to all members
of oppressed groups, since it is founded in individual experience, the collective alternative
hermeneutical resources that arise from reflection on these individual perceptions are not given.
Rather, they are generated through hard-fought resistance to dominant hermeneutical resources
and entrenched hermeneutical lacunae, and this resistance is made more burdensome by
members of an oppressed group’s lack of contact with similar others.
At times, Fricker seems to suggest that her conception of hermeneutical injustice includes
the varied epistemic burdens it creates for the oppressed. She notes the importance of courage in
full epistemic development, and writes that “when you find yourself in a situation in which you

3

This is of course complicated by internalized oppressive ideology, but Mills points out that the epistemic
advantage of a peculiar phenomenology remains even among the actively ignorant.
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seem to be the only one to feel the dissonance between received understanding and your own
intimated sense of a given experience, it tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make
sense of the world, or at least the relevant region of the world.” (2007: 163) Fricker notes that it
is nonetheless the case that we can “put a number of people together who have felt a certain
dissonance about an area of social experience… and… the sense of dissonance can increase and
become critically emboldened.” (2007: 168) While Mason is right to note that the oppressed
often have access to hermeneutical resources of their own, she does not adequately deal with the
asymmetric epistemic burdens carried by the oppressed, whose received interpretive heuristics
diverge significantly from their phenomenology, more starkly than for those whose experiences
are better represented by dominant hermeneutical resources. The hermeneutical resources most
readily available, especially to those dispersed among their oppressors, are typically those that
reflect the ideas of those who hold power within society. The resistant resources, which are not
represented in dominant popular media, public discourse, law, etc. are generally less accessible.
In her discussion of the virtue of testimonial justice, Fricker introduces a distinction
between “routine discursive moves in a moral discourse and exceptional, more imaginative
moves in which existing resources are used in an innovative way that stands as a progressive
move in moral consciousness.” (2007: 104) Each individual or group who creates resistant
hermeneutical resources will, because of the ubiquitous dominant discourse, need to make
exceptional discursive moves to gain an accurate understanding of their situation. The loss of
epistemic confidence that results from making repeated exceptional moves will vary according to
that person’s discourse among others with similar experiences4. Dispersal of the oppressed
among their oppressors can thus function to diminish epistemic confidence and make it more

4

It will also depend on the personality and body of similar experiences within one’s own life, as well as the degree
to which the exceptional discursive moves challenge nearby beliefs.
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difficult for members of oppressed groups to develop their individual understandings of their
peculiar phenomenology.
There is textual evidence that Fricker factors these effects of dispersal into her account of
hermeneutical injustice. She gives an example of a young boy growing up and developing an
understanding of his sexuality, writing “as he grows up, he has to contend with various powerful
bogeyman constructions of The Homosexual. None of them fits, but these collective
understandings are so powerful, and the personal experiential promise of an alternative
understanding so lonely and inarticulate.” (2007: 165) Further, she notes that there are typically
norms of social epistemic interaction counteracting such dispersal: “Even in the most severely
oppressive societies, members of the most subordinated groups will rely on and cooperate
epistemically with each other, and this will remain so even if they have internalized the
oppressive ideology to a significant degree.” (2007: 131) Thus, in spite of her occasional binary
language about understanding or misunderstanding, we can best make sense of Fricker’s account
of hermeneutical injustice as positing a spectrum of intensity from the most severe forms,
involving complete isolation with access only to one’s own individual pre-theoretic experiences
to less severe forms, involving hermeneutical resources shared to various degrees across an
oppressed group but unintelligible or unfamiliar to one’s oppressors or to those who have limited
contact with similar others.
Fricker writes that hermeneutical injustice renders an experience “inadequately
conceptualized and so ill-understood, perhaps even by the subjects themselves” (2007:6) While
Mason interprets her to suggest that the relevant experience is unintelligible including to one’s
self, I understand Fricker to mean that an experience is rendered unintelligible only in its more
intense forms even to the subject. I now turn to Medina’s analysis of epistemic virtues and argue
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that the ostensibly virtuous actions he identifies lack key features of epistemic virtues but are
similar to the sort of resistant epistemic labor Mason points us toward among the oppressed,
which I have argued is a component of hermeneutical injustice.
5

MEDINA’S EPISTEMIC VIRTUES

Medina introduces his discussion of epistemic virtues and vices by noting that “epistemic
advantages and disadvantages, fortunately, do not correlate perfectly with non-epistemic forms
of privilege and oppression.” (2013:28-9) He draws attention to some epistemic advantages of
the oppressed and epistemic disadvantages of oppressors, and identifies three epistemic virtues
that are often demonstrated by the oppressed but rare among oppressors: epistemic humility,
intellectual curiosity/diligence, and open-mindedness. He argues that we should not give a
“prima facie presumption of epistemic superiority” (2013:45) to specific perspectives of
oppressed subjects, but that distinctive experiences unique to the oppressed can affect the
epistemic character of subjects such that they are able to develop a subversive lucidity about
oppression. In the following sections I argue against the proposal that lucidity about oppression
is evidence of epistemic virtues’ prevalence among the oppressed. The argument hinges on the
domain-specificity of apparent epistemic virtues, and since, for better or worse, attitudes about
one’s intellectual abilities and limitations are often relatively global, I will focus here on
Medina’s analysis of intellectual curiosity/diligence and open-mindedness.
Intellectual curiosity/diligence, according to Medina, includes “answering cognitive calls
to find out, to face epistemic challenges head-on, to meet cognitive demands, etc.” (2013:51)
This virtue involves the motivation to acknowledge one’s epistemic limits and to persevere in the
actions required to overcome them. Medina describes open-mindedness as “the epistemic feat of
maintaining active in [one’s mind] two cognitive perspectives simultaneously as [one performs]
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various tasks.” (2013:44) Epistemic open-mindedness, he argues, is also found
disproportionately often among the oppressed, since “oppressed subjects tend to feel the need of
being more attentive to the perspectives of others. They have no option but to acknowledge,
respect, and (to some extent) inhabit alternative perspectives, in particular the perspective of the
dominant other(s).” (2013: 44) Just as Medina’s open-mindedness is something the oppressed are
more or less forced into exhibiting, Medina explains that intellectual curiosity/diligence is
prevalent among the oppressed as a result of their peculiar needs. He writes, “Oppressed subjects
frequently find themselves forced to acquire deep familiarity with certain domains, developing
forms of expertise that no one else has.” (2013:44) While the virtue-based explanation of
epistemic advantages possessed by the oppressed is compelling, I maintain that the epistemic
labor occasioned by hermeneutical injustice provides a simpler and more accurate explanation of
those advantages which simultaneously respects the burdensome nature of hermeneutical
marginalization.
6

APPARENT EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AS EPISTEMIC LABOR

While it is true that oppression necessitates curiosity, diligence, and open-mindedness
about certain epistemic affairs, it is not clear that the virtues of epistemic curiosity/diligence and
open-mindedness are evidenced by (even compelling and well-developed) perspectives about
oppression. As I have argued above, hermeneutical marginalization makes it the case that
accessing, forming, and circulating hermeneutical resources are burdensome tasks. Achieving
lucidity about oppression, then, often requires epistemic labor that may appear (and may be)
virtuous as the oppressed acquire the interpretive resources which are in their interests yet
obscured by hermeneutical injustice. That the oppressed on average put in much effort to form,
consider, and circulate certain beliefs, though, even if these beliefs turn out to be true, is a
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necessary but not sufficient condition for epistemically virtuous activity. We should expect those
who possess the virtue of open-mindedness, for example, to examine potential challenges or
alternatives to many of their beliefs, or for the epistemically curious and diligent to persevere in
discovering truths generally, but as Medina points out, “having one kind of multiplicitous or
kaleidoscopic consciousness does not guarantee lucidity with respect to other forms of
oppression.” (2013:202) Even racist women, classist queers, and sexist people of color may
possess non-trivial domain-specific phenomenological and reflective epistemic advantages about
their own oppression without a general disposition toward open-mindedness, epistemic
curiosity/diligence, or other intellectual virtues.
Though complicated by intersectionality, the interests of the oppressed more often are in
truths about the relevant social experience than are the interests of the oppressors, who may
benefit from the circulation of false beliefs. Meeting one’s epistemic needs will on average
produce truth more often when one’s interests align with truth. Epistemic virtues can aid in this
process but are not necessary for there to be a higher probability of accuracy among the
perspectives of the oppressed. Of course, we may also find that the oppressed are more likely to
develop actual epistemic virtues, but these are not necessary for the domain-specific epistemic
advantages Medina claims they reveal. Evidence of epistemically virtuous activity is more
clearly demonstrated by resistant perspectives on oppression held by those who do not
experience the type of oppression in question than by resistant perspectives held by the
relevantly oppressed.
7

MEDINA’S HERMENEUTICAL SENSITIVITY

For Fricker, the virtue of hermeneutical justice “is an alertness or sensitivity to the
possibility that the difficulty one’s interlocutor is having as she tries to render something
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communicatively intelligible is due… to some sort of gap in collective hermeneutical resources.”
(2007: 169) It therefore applies when one has already become (in some way) aware of the
relevant type(s) of oppression. She cautions, though, that “hermeneutical marginalization is first
and foremost the product of unequal relations of social power more generally, and as such is not
the sort of thing that could itself be eradicated by what we do as virtuous hearers alone.”
(2007:174) Fricker’s virtue of hermeneutical justice functions much like a domain-specific
epistemic humility.
Medina rejects Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice as fundamentally a structural
injustice which is not perpetrated by agents and argues that “hermeneutically sensitive and alert
interlocutors can contribute to bring about hermeneutical justice.” (2013:113) He holds that
agents resist new hermeneutical resources but could do much to avoid the reinforcement of
hermeneutical injustice, and so argues for an expanded responsibility of hearers with respect to
hermeneutical injustice. Medina writes, “for as long as we remain entrenched in dynamics that
block new forms of understanding and foster communicative dysfunctions, we are contributing
to hermeneutical marginalization and, if that marginalization is based on identity prejudices and
correlated with disparities in identity power, we are perpetrating a hermeneutical injustice.”
(2013:111) For Medina, resisting hermeneutical injustice and refraining from reinforcing it
require a more robust virtue of hermeneutical sensitivity than Fricker proposes. He argues that
the responsibility for perpetrating hermeneutical injustices corresponds to one’s social roles, with
academics and journalists carrying relatively more responsibility than parents and teachers, who
are still more responsible than those who do not participate significantly in the epistemic
development of others. Medina calls for all subjects, though, to become “hermeneutically open,”
(2013:114) which means “being alert and sensitive to eccentric voices and styles as well as to
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nonstandard meanings and interpretative perspectives.” (2013:114) The openness Medina calls
for is not domain-specific and does not apply only where some form of oppression is identified
as relevant.
In what follows, I argue that Medina’s expanded hermeneutical sensitivity is not so much
an expansion of Fricker’s hermeneutical sensitivity as a distinct obligation of epistemic humility.
In distinguishing the domain-specific hermeneutical sensitivity Fricker calls for from Medina’s
more global and eternally open sensitivity, I acknowledge the interest agents may have in
achieving rough social understandings which allow for rest from epistemic labor and some ways
in which hermeneutical injustice, even as it is successfully resisted, limits the choices of
oppressed agents.
8

MEDINA’S HERMENEUTICAL SENSITIVITY AS EPISTEMIC HUMILITY
I wholeheartedly agree with Medina’s call for an ever-open sensitivity to the possibility

of new experiences and new interpretations of apparently familiar experiences, but I maintain
that this global sensitivity is distinct from a hermeneutical sensitivity which responds to
identified forms of oppression, in that it functions more like a truly global or general epistemic
humility than does Fricker’s domain-specific response.
Medina rightfully points out that dominant social understandings can be rough and
inaccurate. He compares the understandings queer people often have of their sexuality to those
which straight people, who are not expected to deny, repress, and question their attractions
develop. The former tend to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of sexuality than the latter.
In presenting the epistemic benefits of being queer in a heteronormative society, though, Medina
fails to note the privilege of having relatively easy access to a simple and easily communicated
explanation for one’s experiences, even if it does not quite fit all the nuances of one’s
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phenomenology. The dominant in this way enjoy the right to choose to pursue a more developed
understanding of some experience simply for the epistemic benefits of the pursuit, or to avoid
such a pursuit in favor of rest from epistemic labor or directing one’s efforts elsewhere. There is
significant privilege in the freedom to choose where to focus one’s epistemic labors which
hermeneutical marginalization limits for the oppressed by both making it the case that only metalucid interpretations will be accurate enough to meet (some of) their epistemic needs, and by
vitiating the circulation of resistant perspectives so that shared experiences might be more
readily, if roughly, understood by those who would find them helpful.
Medina is right to point out that the interpretive resources of any group are inherently
inadequate for providing a fully nuanced understanding of some social experience and that
understanding better describes a goal toward which hermeneutical resources point than a
description of what they provide. In praising the meta-lucidity of resistant interpretive resources,
though, Medina overlooks the interest agents may have in resting from the epistemic labor
involved in working toward understanding. A concept like “gay,” in spite of its inability to
capture much about a person’s experiences of attraction and love, can be helpful for those who
wish to simply introduce their partner to others as a romantic partner of the same gender and to
end the theorizing about gender and sexuality at that. Those who employ such rough concepts are
nonetheless rightfully called to recognize that the concepts they use are simply tools for
communicating about and achieving some understanding of one’s experiences. Epistemic
humility, that is, is appropriate for all hermeneutical resources.
Fricker’s domain-specific epistemic humility, though, which requires a targeted epistemic
humility when one has recognized that oppression may make a person or group’s ability to
theorize and communicate about their experience more burdensome, can not be expanded to the
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virtue of hermeneutical sensitivity that Medina calls for. Our obligations toward identified
systems of oppression are distinct from our obligations toward social concepts generally. If the
domain-specific humility Fricker calls for is simply a part of an obligation we have toward all
hermeneutical resources, it is difficult to make sense of the difference between, for example, a
call for white subjects to listen carefully to perspectives on racialized experience from people of
color, and a call for openness toward some new interpretation about racialized reality which
paints white subjects as the ultimate victims of racism. The latter, though prima facie untenable,
and easily considered a waste of epistemic labor, is not ruled out by Medina’s call for an everopen sensitivity toward the possibilities of new interpretations. We can more readily make sense
of a blameless choice to pause in the exercise of a global epistemic humility than a blameless
choice to pause from the exercise of epistemic humility toward testimony about experiences of
oppression from those whose testimony about oppression is supported by empirical and historical
evidence of such oppression.
I worry that Medina’s hermeneutical openness can do very little to shift the burden of
epistemic labor from oppressed subjects and risks attributing disproportionate credit to dominant
subjects who respond well to the testimony of marginalized subjects. The phenomenon of white
ignorance becoming gradually less suited to whites’ experiences demonstrates the reduction of
epistemic privilege through structural changes which require more epistemic labor from whites,
but it is not clear that dominant subjects can take much credit for this epistemic achievement.
Medina writes,
“Given the new social and cultural conditions of today, it is increasingly hard for whiteness to
remain invisible… Many subjects who were recruited to arrogant white perception in subtle ways
during their upbringing and early socialization find many opportunities throughout their lives to
grow uncomfortable with this racial way of seeing and to develop a critical distance with it. More
and more subjects find it difficult to inhabit the white gaze as a matter of course- no questions
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asked, no worry felt. Farewell to an invisible and uninterrogated white common sense.”
(2013:217)

As white subjects’ epistemic needs have shifted, their epistemic behavior has adjusted. Some, of
course, may work harder to maintain an active ignorance, while others respond by questioning
the racialized narratives with which they were raised and listening to the testimony of people of
color. Both responses require epistemic labor. The latter response, though, is better described as
a communicative achievement by people of color (perhaps supported by the virtue of testimonial
sensitivity) than a demonstration of hermeneutical sensitivity by whites.
Filming and sharing interactions with the police, for example, is a means of resisting
hermeneutical injustice, but whites who have been unfamiliar with police violence and
mistreatment of people of color yet begin to accept the reality of racism when exposed to such
testimony have simply avoided discounting testimony about racism because it is made by people
of color, and so have simply not perpetrated testimonial injustice. Dominant subjects do not
universally resist novel or unfamiliar understandings of social phenomena, and a blanket
suspicion of the novel does not constitute an injustice.
Medina rightly calls us to recognize that even our resistant hermeneutical resources are
heuristics and never perfectly accurate truths, given the dynamic and ever-changing nature of the
social experiences hermeneutical resources address, but the imperfect heuristics to which this
humility is rightfully applied may be more or less accurate, and so exceptional discursive moves
of different intensities may be demanded by the epistemic needs of different subjects.
9

CONCLUSION

I have argued that hermeneutical injustice is best understood as including the inordinate
effort required by oppressed subjects to meet their epistemic needs. Hermeneutical

21

marginalization does not prevent subjects from making sense of their experiences, but it makes it
the case that understanding and communicating about those experiences involves more work
than would be necessary if those with similar experiences were accorded full participation in the
mainstream epistemic community. While some may develop epistemic virtues as they do this
work, epistemic virtues are not necessary to accord a higher probability of truth to the
perspectives developed by oppressed subjects than to those developed by their oppressors.
Generally, the oppressed must develop their hermeneutical resources with those who have
somewhat shared experiences. The role of the oppressors in response to this development is most
centrally to exhibit the virtue of testimonial sensitivity.
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